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Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) is an acute viral respiratory illness with high mortality caused by a new strain of 
betacoronavirus (MERS-CoV). Since the report of the first patient in Saudi Arabia in 2012, large-scale outbreaks through hos-
pital-acquired infection and inter-hospital transmission have been reported. Most of the patients reported in South Korea were 
also infected in hospital settings. Therefore, to eliminate the spread of MERS-CoV, infection prevention and control measures 
should be implemented with rigor. The present guideline has been drafted on the basis of the experiences of infection control in 
the South Korean hospitals involved in the recent MERS outbreak and on domestic and international infection prevention and 
control guidelines. To ensure efficient MERS-CoV infection prevention and control, care should be taken to provide compre-
hensive infection control measures including contact control, hand hygiene, personal protective equipment, disinfection, and 
environmental cleaning.
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Background and purpose
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), an acute respi-
ratory illness first discovered in the Middle East in 2012, has 
been gradually spreading all over the world. In May 2015, the 
MERS outbreak in South Korea lasted over two months, leav-
ing behind 186 confirmed cases including 36 deaths [1, 2].
The pathogen responsible for MERS is a type of coronavirus 
(CoV) phylogenetically placed in the same genus as SARS-
CoV. Unlike other known coronaviruses, both MERS- and 
SARS-CoV cause inflammation of the upper respiratory tract 
and spread down to the lower respiratory tract in most cases, 
resulting in deadly lung damage and death. The average incu-
bation period, i.e. the period from exposure to symptom on-
set, is 5-7 days (range: 2-14 days) [3]. The main initial symp-
tom is a fever, followed by symptoms of acute respiratory 
infection about 5 days later. If the lungs are affected, mechani-
cal ventilation becomes necessary due to acute respiratory 
failure, and extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) 
or a hemodialysis procedure may be required, depending on 
the severity of the infection. Chronically ill patients and 
healthcare workers (HCWs) are at a high risk of infection. Be-
cause of its high mortality rate, compliance with hospital in-
fection prevention and control guidelines is more important 
than during any other infectious disease outbreaks. 
This guideline is designed to contribute to improved emer-
gency preparedness and a more efficient response to out-
breaks in the future to prevent the transmission of MERS-CoV 
infection based on the experiences with and lessons from the 
MERS outbreak in South Korea in 2015. 
Scope and subjects
This treatment guideline centers on the principles of infec-
tion prevention and control, such as the operation of in-
tra-hospital isolation and management for MERS patients and 
monitoring and control of contacts as well as use of personal 
protective equipment (PPE), cleaning and disinfection, and 
other precautions. Because laboratory biosafety related to 
testing for MERS-CoV shall be handled separately in the 
guideline on laboratory testing, this guideline will not address 
it in detail. The use of preventive antivirals after being exposed 
to MERS-CoV is also excluded from this guideline due to the 
lack of evidence to support it. 
Constitution of guideline development committee
In July of 2015, the MERS-CoV Infection Prevention and 
Control Guideline Development Committee were constituted 
with experts recommended by the joint panel of the Korean 
Society of Infectious Diseases, Korean Society for Health-
care-associated Infection, and Korean Association of Infection 
Control Nurses. The MERS-CoV Infection Prevention and 
Control Guideline Development Committee is composed of 
six specialists from the divisions of infectious diseases of 
teaching hospitals in South Korea and four nurses specialized 
in infection control. 
Literature search
On PubMed (www.pubmed.gov), papers published post-
2012 regarding MERS-CoV infection prevention and control 
guidelines were searched using keywords such as Middle East 
Respiratory Syndrome, infection control, quarantine, environ-
mental cleaning, disinfectant, and transmission, and combi-
nations thereof. 
Definitions of the strength of recommendation 
and quality of evidence
The strength of recommendation and the quality of evidence 
for recommendation were defined by adopting those used in 
the guidelines of the Infectious Diseases Society of America 
with partial adaptations (Table 1). Each of the key recommen-
dations was determined in a 10-member expert panel discus-
sion. The key recommendations thus established were evalu-
ated by the MERS-CoV Infection Prevention and Control 
Guideline Development Committee and external infectious 
Table 1. Strength of recommendation and quality of evidence for recommendation
Strength of recommendation Quality of evidence for recommendation
A: Should always be offered I: One or more properly designed randomized, controlled trials
B: Should generally be offered II: One or more well-designed, nonrandomized trials
C: Optional III: Expert opinion, descriptive studies
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disease specialists, which was reflected in the final correction 
of recommendations and their strength of recommendation 
prior to guideline drafting. A draft version of the recommen-
dations was reviewed by the infectious disease specialists of 
the Rapid Response Team for MERS, and the issues raised 
were reflected in the final version of the guideline.
1. Basic principles of infection prevention and 
control
Key recommendations
1. The core of infection prevention and control is blocking 
the transmission of MERS-CoV through early diagnosis 
and intra-hospital isolation (AIII).
2. A MERS-CoV infection emergency committee is con-
vened to implement adequate management of the basic 
elements of infection prevention and control, namely, 
the structure, system, and processes (BII).
3. Patients with a suspected or confirmed MERS-CoV in-
fection should be diagnosed in a timely manner and 
placed in isolation rooms with contact and droplet pre-
cautions to control the infection source (AIII). 
4. Clinical, epidemiological, and laboratory assessments 
should be performed and reported as rapidly as possi-
ble and pertinent infrastructures for implementing in-
fection prevention and control measures are to be es-
tablished simultaneously (AIII).
5. Nosocomial transmission in healthcare facilities should 
be prevented by placing suspected or confirmed pa-
tients in isolation rooms with adequate ventilation for 
efficient environmental disinfection (AII).
6. Before contacting each suspected or confirmed patient, 
HCWs should wear gloves, a gown, highly efficient 
mask, and goggles or a face shield in the proper se-
quence and manner (AII).
7. A suspected or confirmed patient should be required to 
wear a mask, gown, and gloves before exiting the room 
and move using isolated routes to avoid contact with 
non-MERS patients (AIII).
1) General principles
The MERS outbreak in South Korea occurred in hospital set-
tings through contacts with infected outpatients and inpa-
tients [3]. This transmission pathway is characterized by the 
transmission through super-spreaders and nosocomial trans-
mission in healthcare facilities, similar to the main infection 
routes among Saudi Arabian MERS patients [4]. Therefore, the 
most important measure for infection prevention and control 
of MERS-CoV is blocking the transmission through early diag-
nosis of suspected or confirmed patients and their intra-hos-
pital isolation (AIII) [5-7]. 
To minimize the exposure to and transmission of MERS-
CoV, infection prevention and control measures should be 
implemented systematically based on the standard, contact, 
and droplet precautions (AIII). Exceptionally, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) recommends airborne precau-
tions for MERS patients requiring aerosol-generating medical 
procedures, such as mechanical ventilation, endotracheal in-
tubation, and endotracheal aspiration (AIII) [8-10]. 
Community healthcare facilities and health centers as well 
as national agencies such as Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention should set up an efficient communication network 
and methodology to share real-time information regarding 
the outbreak situation (CIII) [11].
Table 2. Composition of a MERS infection emergency committee
Category Composition of a MERS infection emergency committee
Committee Chair Hospital Director
Ex officio members
Chief of Internal Medicine Chief of Surgery
Chief of the Infection Control Division Chief of the Dispensary
Infection Control Officer Chief Procurement Officer
Chief of Diagnostic Medicine Chief Administrator
Head Nurse Chief of the Nutritional Care Division 
Chief of Emergency Medicine Director-General
Chief of the Intensive Care Unit Chief of the Technical Division
MERS, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome.
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2) Constitution of the MERS infection emergency commit-
tee
A hospital that already has an infection control division 
should convene a MERS-CoV infection emergency committee 
based on the infection control division (Table 2). The MERS 
infection emergency committee should be comprised of the 
Committee Chair (hospital director) and the heads of the divi-
sions involved, such as patient liaison services, the infection 
control division, diagnostic testing division, technical division, 
administrative division, and nutritional care division. In par-
ticular, the MERS infection emergency committee should in-
clude an infection control team for focused management of 
policies and their implementation (AII) [11, 12].
Committee members should be reachable in an around-the-
clock communication network to ensure constant fine-tuning 
of the MERS-CoV infection prevention and control policies 
and their efficient implementation for the prevention of noso-
comial transmission in healthcare facilities.  An evi-
dence-based infection prevention and control program 
should be derived and implemented in real time, and its com-
pliance and effect should be evaluated. Inter-division cooper-
ation should be supported, monitored, and trained. Particular 
care should be taken to ensure adequate management of the 
basic elements of infection prevention and control, i.e. struc-
ture, system, and processes [13].
3) Basic elements of infection prevention and control
The basic elements of MERS-CoV infection prevention and 
control include administrative measures, environmental and 
engineering measures, and PPE [11].
Administrative measures are the most critical element in es-
tablishing and implementing infection prevention and control 
strategies. Patients who are suspected or confirmed to be in-
fected should be screened for early diagnosis and placed un-
der droplet precautions and quarantine to control the infec-
tion source (AIII). Clinical, epidemiological, and laboratory 
assessments of suspected or confirmed cases should be per-
formed and reported as rapidly as possible [14]. Infrastruc-
tures of infection prevention and control should be estab-
lished to ensure real-time patient control and laboratory 
testing (AIII) [15]. Additionally, based on pertinent guidelines, 
MERS-CoV infection emergency committee should assure ad-
equate and systematic provisions of medical services and 
stored materials. While implementing the policies set by the 
MERS-CoV infection emergency committee, constant moni-
toring of infrastructures should also be provided, as well as ef-
ficient allocation of necessary personnel and medical resourc-
es and training and education of HCWs, patients and their 
caregivers, and visitors (BII) [16, 17]. The administration team 
should also manage waiting and admitted patients and take 
precautions against the overcrowding of waiting areas. It is 
also responsible for monitoring the health status of HCWs, in-
cluding acute respiratory infection. The compliance of the en-
tire hospital staff with the infection prevention and control 
policies including hand hygiene need to be assessed and 
monitored constantly (CII) [18, 19].
Environmental and engineering management of hospital fa-
cilities is also of vital importance [20]. Appropriate ventilation, 
adequate room for the allocation of patients, and efficient en-
vironmental disinfection are crucial for preventing nosocomi-
al transmission in healthcare facilities (AII) [21]. Suspected or 
confirmed infected patients should be placed in isolation 
rooms with an appropriate ventilation system (AII) [5, 22, 23], 
and the ventilation system and negative room pressure should 
be checked at least once a day. The patients in waiting rooms 
are recommended to be separated from each other by at least 
2 m for both those with acute respiratory disease and other ill-
nesses (CIII) [15]. 
PPE includes gown, gloves, highly efficient mask, and gog-
gles or face shield, which should be worn in a proper and con-
stant manner (AII) [17]. PPE is the most frequently required 
and vulnerable aspect of infection control measures [7]. 
Therefore, administrative and environmental/engineering 
measures should be implemented concurrently with proper 
hand hygiene and PPE compliance [24].
4) Operation of screening desks and quarantine clinics
Rapid diagnosis and quarantine of suspected or confirmed 
MERS-CoV infected patients should be assured by staff at 
screening desks and quarantine clinics (AII) [25]. A screening 
desk is an important system, which is recommended to be in-
stalled at all entrances and exits as well as all medical care ar-
eas to monitor for fever and signs and symptoms of respirato-
ry infection, and to detect suspected or confirmed cases in a 
timely manner (BII) [16]. The HCWs assigned to a screening 
desk should use a screening template to easily classify individ-
uals requiring quarantine in clinics. Additionally, a visitor log 
is recommended to be filled in by all individuals that pass 
through the screening checkpoint to allow for rapid identifica-
tion and assessment of their contact risk levels whenever a 
MERS-CoV infected case is confirmed (BIII). Once a patient is 
classified as a case for quarantine care, the patient should 
wear a mask and move to the quarantine clinic through a sep-
arate path accompanied by a HCW.
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A quarantine clinic is an area where suspected infected pa-
tients receive care. Information posters should be displayed at 
the entrances and exits, emergency rooms, and medical care 
areas, requesting those under quarantine to immediately 
present to HCWs upon experiencing fever and respiratory 
symptoms [11].
A quarantine clinic is installed in an isolated area allowing 
efficient ventilation (AII). In the case of an intra-hospital quar-
antine clinic, it should be located in an area without any risk 
of contaminating the air of other hospital areas, i.e. an area 
equipped with HEPA filtration and a ventilation system or re-
circulation through a separate air conditioning system. In-
struction signboards should be placed around the clinic to 
prohibit access to non-designated individuals, and the admit-
tance of caregivers should also be limited. All quarantined in-
dividuals and their visitors should be informed of the contact 
and droplet precautions by posting related information sheets 
throughout the clinic. Visitors should move along designated 
paths to minimize contact with non-MERS patients, and quar-
antined patients’ movement and transport routes should be 
arranged to have only one direction. The waiting area of a con-
sultation room is recommended ideally to be installed in an 
open-air setting, keeping the patient-to-patient distance at ≥2 
m, and all waiting patients are to be instructed to wear a mask 
(BII) [5]. Symptomatic and asymptomatic patients are recom-
mended to be placed separately while waiting for their turn 
for diagnostic or therapeutic care (BII) [5]. Symptomatic pa-
tients are recommended to be handled separately according 
to the severity of their symptoms by classifying them into mild 
and severe groups. Asymptomatic contacts should be classi-
fied according to their level of exposure (BII) [5]. A rapid han-
dling system would be provided to avoid overcrowding of the 
waiting area (CIII) [26, 27]. The air in the consultation rooms 
must be at negative pressure and equipped with an in-room 
HEPA filtration system. Under limited facility conditions, at 
least 12 air changes per hour (ACH) need to be provided (Ta-
ble 3). All HCWs should wear PPE (BII) [28]. A consultation 
room should be equipped with a hand-wash basin for HCWs, 
hand sanitizer, and other hand hygiene items (liquid soap dis-
penser, paper towel), and the used paper towels, tissues, and 
gloves should be discarded into a waste container without 
handles. 
Because a sampling area is a space where patients with sus-
pected MERS-CoV infection are likely to release infectious 
particles, air circulation needs to be accompanied by filtration 
(BII). Thus, it must be at negative pressure and equipped with 
in-room HEPA filtration system or, in the absence thereof, 12 
ACH should be provided (Table 3) [28]. In the sampling area, 
information posters are recommended to be displayed for the 
patients to sample their own sputa, or HCWs wearing PPE 
take laryngopharyngeal smear samples (BIII). Patients should 
be instructed to perform hand hygiene before exiting, and the 
environment exposed to each patient should be disinfected 
every time. After the exit of a patient with suspected infection, 
entrance into the room should be limited for a sufficient lapse 
of time for the removal of infectious particles (AIII).
Radiological examination areas are also recommended to 
be at negative pressure and equipped with a HEPA filtration 
system or, in the absence thereof, at least 12 ACH are required 
using portable HEPA filters (BIII) [28]. In isolated spaces, por-
table apparatuses are used and the environment exposed to a 
patient should be disinfected after each use; entrance into 
these spaces should not be permitted within 30 min of disin-
fection (Table 3) (AIII) [28]. 
5) Isolation room
Patients with suspected or confirmed MERS-CoV infection 
are given care in negative pressure isolation rooms equipped 
with HEPA filters. If exhaust air cannot be removed via a venti-
lation system, care should be taken to prevent the exhaust air 
released without filtration from reentering the isolation room. 
A suspected or confirmed patient should be placed in a sin-
gle-occupancy isolation room with a toilet, hand sanitizer, and 
dedicated hand-wash basins for both the patient and HCWs 
(AIII) [29]. An anteroom for wearing and removing PPE 
should also be prepared. A means of communication, such as 
a telephone, should be provided, and personal belongings 
and furniture should be kept at minimum. The stethoscope, 
thermometer, blood pressure monitor and cuff should be des-
ignated for each patient. A waste container without handles 
Table 3. Time required for infectious agent removal based on the number 
of air changes per hour (adapted from CDC guideline [28])
Air changes  
per hour 
Minutes required for removal efficiency
99% 99.9%
2 138 207
4 69 104
6 46 69
12 23 35
15 18 28
20 14 21
50 6 8
400 <1 1
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for used paper towels, tissues, and gloves as well as hand hy-
giene items (liquid soap dispenser, lotion, paper towel, hand 
sanitizer) should also be provided.
6) Movement and transport routes for patients and HCWs
Patients with suspected or confirmed MERS-CoV infection 
should move along designated routes separate from the main 
traffic routes to avoid contacts with other patients. They 
should wear a gown, mask, and gloves (AIII) [5, 30]. Inter-hos-
pital transfer needs to be limited to absolutely necessary cases 
(BIII) [30]. If referral to another hospital is inevitable, detailed 
data on the patient’s clinical condition should be provided for 
the referral hospital. During transportation, suspected or con-
firmed patients should be accompanied only by HCWs; if 
caregivers accompany patients in exceptional cases, they 
should wear the same-level PPE as the HCWs. Separate and 
rapid medical care and admission procedures are required.
2. Definition of MERS patient and contact control
Key recommendations
1. If a contact of a patient with confirmed MERS-CoV in-
fection develops a fever or respiratory symptoms, a 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test should be per-
formed, and hospitalized quarantine care is recom-
mended (AIII).
2. An asymptomatic contact should conduct self-quaran-
tine or contact surveillance depending on the exposure 
risk assessment (AIII).
3. Among recent travelers from the countries affected by 
MERS-CoV outbreaks, those who develop a fever and 
respiratory symptoms or pneumonia should be consid-
ered as patients with suspected MERS-CoV infection 
and placed under inpatient quarantine care (AIII).
4. Among recent travelers from the countries affected by 
MERS-CoV outbreaks, those who do not show symp-
toms of pneumonia and show only one symptom of a 
fever and respiratory infection should undergo the PCR 
test and be instructed to conduct self-quarantine for 14 
days (AIII).
1) Definitions of MERS-CoV infection cases
HCWs wearing adequate PPE should obtain samples from 
patients with suspected MERS-CoV infection matching the 
case definition. Such patients should then be immediately 
subjected to quarantine measures (Table 4).
2) Risk assessment and control of the cases of exposure to 
MERS-CoV infection
Contact risk assessment is performed taking into account 
the contact category, patient group characteristics, and con-
tact environments (size, location, and ventilation condition of 
the space), and appropriate quarantine or contact surveil-
lance measures should be taken according to the assessed risk 
level. Quarantined patients and their contacts should be mon-
itored jointly by the Ministry of Health and Welfare and 
healthcare facilities, and local community health centers are 
responsible for monitoring self-quarantine or the contact sur-
veillance of contacts.
Table 4. Definitions of MERS-CoV infection cases
Confirmed case
A patient with laboratory-confirmed MERS-CoV infection
Suspected case
1. A patient showing respiratory symptoms (cough, shortness of breath) accompanied by fever or pneumonia (clinical or radiological 
diagnosis) and a history of 
- travel in the Middle East regiona 14 days before symptom onset or
- close contactb with a symptomatic patient who developed fever and acute respiratory symptoms within 14 days of traveling in the 
Middle East regiona
2. A patient showing fever or respiratory symptoms (cough, shortness of breath) with a history of close contactb within 14 days with a 
patient with laboratory-confirmed MERS-CoV infection during his/her symptomatic period.
3. A patient showing respiratory symptoms (cough, shortness of breath) accompanied by fever or pneumonia among those who were 
staff, patients, and visitors in the healthcare facilitiesc with a MERS outbreak within 14 days before symptom onset.
aThe Middle East region includes the Arabian Peninsula and its neighboring countries (Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Israel and the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE, and Yemen).
bClose contact refers to a case of direct contact with droplets a MERS patient without wearing appropriate personal protective equipment (gown, gloves, highly efficient 
mask, goggles or face shield) and/or staying within a 2 m distance or in the same interior space with a patient.
cMERS outbreak refers to two or more cases of laboratory-confirmed MERS-CoV infection in the same healthcare facility.
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Contacts with patients with confirmed MERS-CoV infection 
experiencing a fever or respiratory symptoms should be sub-
jected to PCR test and hospitalized quarantine care should be 
recommended (AIII) (Fig. 1). Self-quarantine or contact sur-
veillance should be conducted for asymptomatic contacts de-
pending on the exposure risk level assessment (AIII) (Table 5). 
If individuals who had no direct contact with a confirmed pa-
tient but visited Middle Eastern countries affected by MERS-
CoV outbreaks develop respiratory symptoms accompanied 
by a fever or pneumonia, they are considered suspected pa-
tients and should be placed under inpatient quarantine care 
(AIII) (Table 6). Patients who do not show symptoms of pneu-
monia and show either a fever or respiratory infection should 
undergo the MERS-CoV PCR test and are instructed to con-
duct self-quarantine for 14 days (AIII). If two repeated PCR 
tests were negative, these patients were recommended to 
continue self-quarantine for 14 days. However, in case of posi-
tive results, the patients should be regarded to have MERS-
CoV infections.
Contact surveillance refers to regular checks of symptom 
Table 5. Risk assessment and recommendations for asymptomatic MERS contacts
Risk classification
Disease status of the infection source
Asymptomatic Symptomatic, without pneumonia Symptomatic, with pneumonia
High-risk close contact Quarantine Quarantine Quarantine
Intermediate-risk close contact Contact surveillance Quarantine Quarantine
Casual contact No intervention Contact surveillance Contact surveillance
High-risk close contact: contact during an aerosol-generating procedure (e.g. nebulizer, intubation, endotracheal suction, bronchoscopy, etc.). Intermediate-risk close 
contact: contact within 2 m distance of a laboratory-confirmed MERS patient or a stay at the same ward/floor of a hospital exposed to laboratory-confirmed MERS 
patients. Casual contact: brief contact with >2 m distance from a laboratory-confirmed MERS patients.
MERS, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome.
Table 6. Control of visitors to Middle East countries or healthcare facilities affected by MERS outbreaksa depending on symptom manifestations
Fever Respiratory symptoms Assessment Intervention plan
+ + MERS-suspected PCR test, hospitalization
+ - Medical surveillance PCR test, discharge and self-quarantine for 14 days from the last exposureb
- + Medical surveillance PCR test, discharge and self-quarantine for 14 days from the last exposureb
- - No abnormalities No interventions
MERS, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome; PCR, polymerase chain reaction.
aA healthcare facility with two or more cases of laboratory-confirmed MERS-CoV infection is regarded as being affected by MERS outbreak.
bIn the presence of pneumonia, the patient is classified as a patient with suspected MERS-CoV infection and placed under inpatient quarantine care.
Figure 1. Control of close contacts of a laboratory-confirmed MERS-CoV infection case.
MERS-CoV, middle east respiratory syndrome coronavirus; PCR, polymerase chain reaction; MERS, middle east respiratory 
syndrome.
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onset while maintaining daily activities applicable to cases of 
low exposure to patients with suspected or confirmed MERS-
CoV infection, whereas self-quarantine refers to living in 
self-imposed isolation due to high infection risks in cases of 
close contact (≤2 m) or stayed at the closed space with sus-
pected or confirmed infected patients.
3. Hand hygiene and PPE
Key recommendations
1. Infection prevention and control measures should be 
implemented systematically based on the standard, 
contact, and droplet precautions (AIII).
2. Hand hygiene should be performed before and after ev-
ery patient contact, whenever hands come into contact 
with patient’s blood, body fluids, secretions, excretions, 
and other contaminants or after touching the patient’s 
immediate environment, and before and after wearing 
PPE (AIII). 
3. Aerosol-generating procedures for suspected or con-
firmed MERS-infected patients should be performed 
based on standard, contact, and airborne precautions 
(AI).
4. HCWs should don and remove gloves, gown (coverall), 
highly efficient mask, goggles or face shield in the prop-
er sequence and manner before and after every contact 
with a suspected or confirmed infected patient (AII).
5. Transport of a suspected or confirmed MERS-CoV in-
fected patient should be undertaken using separate 
routes, and patients should wear mask, gown, and 
gloves during transportation (AIII).
1) Hand hygiene
Hand hygiene should be performed before and after every 
patient contact, whenever hands come into contact with pa-
tient’s blood, body fluids, secretions, and other contaminants 
or touch patient’s immediate environment, and before and af-
ter donning and removing PPE (AIII). Hand hygiene should 
be performed using water and soap when hands are visibly 
soiled with contaminants, and if not, using alcohol-based 
hand rub sanitizer for 20-30 s, applying enough sanitizer to 
cover all hand surfaces and rubbing until the sanitizer is com-
pletely dry on the hands. Hand hygiene using water and soap 
should be performed as follows: wet hands with water, apply 
enough soap, rub hands to cover all hand surfaces with soap, 
rinse, and thoroughly dry hands with disposable towels (time 
required: 40-60 s). Healthcare facilities must supply hand hy-
giene sinks and products.
2) Personal protective equipment
HCWs should don gloves and gown (coverall), highly effi-
cient mask, and goggles or face shield in the proper sequence 
and manner prior to every contact with a suspected or con-
firmed patient (AII). When in close contact with patients with 
suspected or confirmed MERS-CoV infection to perform pa-
tient-care activities, including both medical procedures and 
other activities such as transport, cleaning, and catering, all 
employees must wear appropriate PPE to prevent exposure to 
MERS-CoV. Adherence to the proper sequence and procedure 
is important to avoid contamination in the process of donning 
and removing PPE [31, 32]. Disposable PPE is recommended, 
and in case of reuse, cleaning and disinfection should be per-
formed as recommended by the manufacturers [11, 32]. All 
staff members requiring PPE should be trained until they are 
competent in the proper selection of PPE matching the situa-
tion and donning/removing it in the proper sequence and 
manner [11, 31, 32]. 
Gloves should be worn to prevent the contamination of 
hands and infiltration of MERS-CoV through damaged skin 
[32, 33]. Gloves should consist of solid materials and fixable 
shapes to avoid damage or slippage. Double gloves may be 
used if necessary, and reuse should be prohibited [32]. Sterile 
gloves should be worn when performing procedures requiring 
aseptic technique [11, 32]. 
A gown made of waterproof material should be worn, with 
its shape and material depending on the level of contact with 
the patient and the degree of exposure to droplets or body flu-
ids [11, 31, 34, 35]. For example, an employee who measures 
fevers at the entrance or exit is allowed to wear a quarantine 
gown because it involves only a rapid contact in an open 
space, while HCWs who enter a room of a patient with respi-
ratory symptoms should wear a coverall to protect their neck 
and lower limbs against exposure. A coverall is an overall with 
separate hood and boot covers. In the event of potential expo-
sure to respiratory secretions and diarrheal stools or other 
body fluids, a waterproof apron should also be put on over the 
coverall or a gown made of more solid material should be 
chosen.
Respiratory protective equipment (RPE) includes a highly 
efficient mask and a powered air-purifying respirator (PAPR). 
To ensure protection against the inhalation of infectious aero-
sols, a highly efficient mask with a tight seal against the wear-
er’s face should be donned [32]. Filtered masks such as FFP2 
and KF94 with functions comparable to the highly efficient 
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mask can also be used. An RPE should be discarded after leav-
ing an isolation room and exchanged when it becomes wet or 
soiled in an outpatient clinic or open space [11, 15, 31, 32, 34, 
35]. Wearers of RPE should be trained in how to don and fit it 
properly, and it should be checked at all times whether it seals 
tightly to the wearer’s face [32, 33]. The room of a patient re-
ceiving mechanical ventilation may have a high degree of viral 
contamination, and HCWs entering it are at a very high risk of 
exposure. In such cases, use of a PAPR is recommended be-
cause the tight fit of a highly efficient mask cannot be ensured 
due to perspiration while performing medical procedures, 
and prolonged use can cause breathing discomfort. All HCWs 
should be trained how to don and adjust a PAPR properly, and 
fit checking should be performed before and during use.
Goggles can protect the wearer’s eyes against splashes of re-
spiratory secretions, body fluids, and blood from all directions 
[32, 33]. They should have an anti-fog feature. Single use is 
recommended, and if reused, they should be sufficiently dis-
infected [11]. 
A face shield protects the entire face including the eyes 
against splashes of respiratory secretions, blood, and other 
body fluids [32, 33]. A shape providing a broadest protection, 
from chin to forehead as well as sides, is preferable [11]. Single 
use is recommended; if reused, it should be carefully disin-
fected [5, 7].
3) Appropriate wearing/removal of PPE
Gloves, coveralls, highly efficient mask, and goggles or face 
shield should be properly donned and removed before and 
after every contact with a suspected or confirmed infected pa-
tient (AII) (Tables 7, 8). Appropriate PPE should be selected 
according to the risk level of the task (Table 9) and donned/
removed in a space (anteroom) separate from the patient 
room (Fig. 2). Prior to entering the room, the proper use of 
Table 7. PPE donning procedure (adapted from Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee guideline [35])
1 Hand hygiene
2 Gown
- Select the type of gown matching the task.
- Put it on (opening is in the back) and fasten it in the back of the neck 
and waist.
3 Highly efficient mask
- Place the respirator over the nose, mouth, and chin and check for a tight 
seal around the nose by pressing the nosepiece with the fingertips.
- Grasp the mask with both hands and check for air leakage while 
inhaling and exhaling.
4 Eye shield (goggles or face shield)
- Position goggles over the eyes for a comfortable fit by adjusting the 
headband; or
- Position the face shield over the face and fasten it with the earpieces 
and headband.
5 Gloves
- Put on the gloves.
- Extend to cover the wrist of the gown. 
- Double gloving should be applied, if necessary, depending on the 
protection level required for the task.
PPE, personal protective equipment.
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PPE should be checked by looking into a mirror or by another 
observer. After removing PPE, all items should be discarded 
appropriately to prevent the escape of infectious agents out-
side.
4) Aerosol-generating procedures (AGPs)
AGPs include upper airway endoscopy, sputum induction, 
endotracheal intubation, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, 
open suctioning of airways, and nebulizer therapy. Nebulizer 
therapy should be avoided in an emergency room patient with 
suspected MERS-CoV infection based on clinical and epide-
miological grounds, such as a history of a healthcare facility 
visit and travel to a country affected by a MERS outbreak. If 
necessary, it should be administered in an isolation room. 
AGPs should be performed in a negative pressure room 
equipped with a HEPA filtration system. In the absence there-
of, the hospital engineering division should be requested to 
provide a well-ventilated room independent of the hospital 
Table 8. PPE doffing procedure (adapted from Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee guideline [35])
1 Gloves
- Grasp the wrist edge of the opposite-side glove and peel it off inside 
out.
- Slide the fingers of the ungloved hand under the remaining glove at the 
wrist end and peel it off, rolling it together with the removed glove, and 
discard them.
- Perform hand hygiene.
2 Gown
- Unfasten and pull gown away from the back, with the outer surface 
rolled in to avoid contact of the contaminated side with the body.
- Gown and gloves can be removed together. The more contaminated 
item should be removed first.
3 Goggles/face shield
- Goggles or face shield are removed without touching the front side.
4 Highly efficient mask
- The front side should not be touched.
- First, lift the bottom band over the head, followed by the top band.
- Remove the respirator from the face.
- Discard it into a designated waste container.
5 Hand hygiene should be performed immediately after each removal of 
all PPE items.
PPE, personal protective equipment.
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heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system. All 
HCWs performing AGPs should wear coveralls, RPE, gloves, 
hood, and goggles/face shield. As for the RPE, PAPRs should 
be used instead of highly efficient masks. AGPs should be per-
formed in a closed room, and the door should only be opened 
if absolutely necessary. After a room is used for AGPs, HCWs 
unprotected by PPE should be prohibited from entering the 
room for ≥30 min until the rooms are sufficiently vented out at 
12 ACH (≥99%) (Table 3) [28], and the floor and all other envi-
ronmental surfaces should be disinfected with environmental 
Table 9. PPE application for different situations
Situation Gloves
High-eff. 
mask
PAPR Gown
Coverall incl.  
boot covers
Goggles or face 
shield
Screening desk o o x o x x
Admission/info services (quarantine clinic) o o x o x x
Consultation/nursing (quarantine clinic) o o x x o o
Entrance into patient room (consultation/nursing, etc.) o o x x o o
Aerosol-generating medical procedures o x o x o o
Respiratory specimen collection o  oa  oa x o o
Respiratory specimen examination o o x x o o
Equipment cleaning and disinfection o o x o x o
Patient room cleaning and disinfection o o x x o o
Ambulance transport o o x x o If necessary
PPE, personal protective equipment; PAPR, powered air purifying respirator.
aGenerally, highly efficient mask is recommended, but PAPR is required for the intubated patients.
Figure 2. A schematic of the procedures for donning/doffing of PPE depending on the physical space arrangement.
PPE, personal protective equipment
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disinfection measures.
5) Patient transportation
To minimize the droplet and contact exposures from respi-
ratory secretions, intra-hospital referral of a patient should be 
carried out using designated routes (access-barred or rarely 
used) and patients should wear a mask, gown, and gloves if 
moved (AIII). Accompanying HCWs should wear highly effi-
cient mask, gown, and gloves, to avoid direct contact with the 
patient as much as possible. The referral department should 
be informed in advance to facilitate the admission procedure.
Referral to a different healthcare facility is carried out using 
a community health center ambulance or 119 (the telephone 
number of the fire brigade/emergency ambulance service in 
South Korea corresponding to 911 in the U.S. and Canada) 
emergency ambulance service in collaboration with the local 
community health center. The referral hospital should be pro-
vided with detailed patient data in advance and the arrival 
time should be agreed upon so that admission procedure can 
be prepared. If the patient cannot wear a mask for any reason 
(e.g. oxygenation), goggles are additionally worn when sepa-
rated from the patient by less than 1 m.
4. Laboratory management
Key recommendations
1. HCWs involved in testing procedures are trained in in-
fection control measures and recommended to comply 
with PPE use and personal hygiene regulations (BIII).
2. Radiological examination is performed with portable 
imaging devices in an isolation room. If patient trans-
portation to the imaging room is necessary, a safe trans-
portation method and route are recommended to be 
used to prevent nosocomial transmission of MERS-CoV 
(BIII).
3. Infectious specimens are recommended to be trans-
ported in triple wrapping to the laboratory, and the lab-
oratory is informed of their arrival in advance (BIII).
1) Radiological examination
At all times, radiological examination is recommended to be 
performed by HCWs trained in infection control and PPE 
donning/removal procedures (BIII). To minimize the need for 
intra-hospital transportation of an infected patient, it is rec-
ommended that portable imaging devices are used in the iso-
lation room where the patient is staying (BIII).
Before and after each radiological examination using porta-
ble imaging devices, HCWs are recommended to perform 
hand hygiene and don/remove PPE (coveralls, disposable 
gloves, highly efficient mask, and goggles/face shield) equiva-
lent to that used for patient care (BIII). Imaging equipment 
needs to be disinfected after each use as per the cleaning and 
disinfection guidelines below, depending on the level of con-
tact with the patient (BIII).
For radiological examinations involving patient transporta-
tion, such as computed tomography and magnetic resonance 
imaging, patient transportation-related guidelines shall apply 
(BIII). Disinfection of medical equipment used in the imaging 
room and environmental disinfection/cleaning is recom-
mended to be performed as per the guidelines (BIII).
2) Diagnostic specimen collection, packaging, and trans-
portation
Diagnostic specimen collection is recommended to be per-
formed only by HCWs that are well trained in infection pre-
vention and control and PPE donning/removal procedures 
(BIII). HCWs collecting diagnostic specimens are recom-
mended to perform hand hygiene and wear PPE. Before/after 
collection, the same procedures of donning/removal PPE 
used for patient care should be performed (BIII). When col-
lecting lower respiratory tract samples, AGP-related infection 
control measures should be applied.
Intra-hospital packaging and transportation of diagnostic 
specimens should include double-packaging (Fig. 3). The pri-
mary container (specimen collection container) needs to be 
sealed with a screw-on cap, and damage-resistant plastic is 
Figure 3. Triple-packaging of diagnostic specimens (Category/Package: 
primary container, secondary container, outer package).
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recommended to be used (BIII). Its cover should be cleaned 
with 70% alcohol swabs to eliminate contaminants and put 
into a zipper bag, which is then packaged in the secondary 
container (BIII). If a specimen is transported outside, triple 
packaging is recommended (BIII) (Fig. 3). The primary con-
tainer with its surfaces cleaned with swabs soaked with 70% 
alcohol is put into a zipper back together with absorbent ma-
terial and put into the secondary container, whose cover is 
tightly closed after fixing the primary container within it. The 
whole package is then put into the outer package accompa-
nied by a referral card containing all specimen-related infor-
mation.
The transport of an infectious specimen (respiratory speci-
men) should be notified to the referral laboratory in advance, 
and the package should be labeled “suspected case of MERS-
CoV infection” and directly handed by transport personnel. 
Transport personnel should be trained to handle spill acci-
dents and should possess a treatment kit during transportation.
5. Patient management
Key recommendations
1. A patient with suspected or confirmed MERS-CoV in-
fection should be placed in a single-occupancy negative 
pressure isolation room with a designated toilet (AIII).
2. If single occupancy is impossible, confirmed patients 
having the same exposure source are recommended to 
be placed in the same isolation room as cohort patients 
(BIII).
3. A suspected patient should be isolated in a single room 
at all times (AIII).
1) Outpatient and emergency-room patient management
When moved for treatment, patients with a suspected 
MERS-CoV infection should use routes separate from major 
traffic routes. The air of quarantine areas for outpatients and 
emergency-room patients should not be mixed with that of 
other areas. All medical procedures for suspected patients in-
cluding radiological and laboratory exams should occur in 
designated treatment areas. Hospitalization of a suspected 
patient should be guided via routes separate from major traf-
fic routes (including elevator), accompanied by HCWs.
2) Inpatient management
A patient with suspected or confirmed MERS-CoV infection 
should be placed in a single-occupancy negative pressure iso-
lation room with a designated toilet (AIII). Inpatients are pro-
hibited from leaving their designated isolation rooms during 
the entire duration of the therapy. Their blood, body fluids, se-
cretions, excreta, etc. are thoroughly controlled to prevent ex-
posure of the public to infectious agents. All contaminated 
items should be immediately disinfected or discarded. Dis-
posable medical instruments should be discarded after each 
use. All instruments that are not disposable, such as ther-
mometers and stethoscopes, should be used exclusively for 
their respective designated patients. Meals should be catered 
in non-returnable tableware, and leftovers should be discard-
ed along with medical wastes. Contact and droplet precau-
tions should be displayed on the doors. AGPs such as nebuliz-
er therapy and sputum induction test are administered in 
keeping with airborne precautions. Each patient room is 
equipped with alcohol-based hand sanitizer, a hand wash 
sink, hand hygiene items, and a waste bin.
3) Cohort isolation
Among the hospitals affected with a MERS outbreak, cohort 
isolation is allowed only for small or medium-sized hospitals 
with a limited infection control capacity. As alternative to sin-
gle occupancy, confirmed patients having the same exposure 
source are recommended to be placed in the same room 
(BIII). However, a suspected patient should be isolated in a 
single room at all times (AIII).
The cohort area is established on the basis of the area where 
infection was confirmed in consideration of patients’ move-
ments, the HVAC system, and treatment status as a cluster of 
rooms or a separate ward. Discharge from hospital and 
self-quarantine should not be allowed by principle. Access to 
a quarantine ward is granted only to related persons, and ad-
ditional admission should be prohibited. During the observa-
tion period, leaving the ward is limited to only necessary rea-
sons, such as diagnostic testing. When moving out of the ward, 
PPE should be worn. A suspected patient should be isolated 
in a single room within the quarantine ward until confirmato-
ry diagnosis.
The cohort ward should be managed by a separate group of 
HCWs. HCWs and other staff in the cohort ward should per-
form their respective patient care activities after donning PPE 
and should not treat patients other than those in the cohort 
ward. Whoever presents respiratory symptoms, including 
HCWs and other personnel, should be isolated in a single 
room during the diagnostic examination period. 
4) Special situation management
Endotracheal intubation and its removal in a patient placed 
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on a ventilator should be performed in a negative pressure 
isolation room. After the procedure, the door of the room 
should be kept closed for ≥30 min (ventilation at 12 ACH) un-
til 99% of the contaminated air has been removed [28]. A ven-
tilator with a single-use antimicrobial HEPA filter mounted 
between the patient’s airway and the tube is recommended. 
All items required should be single-use products when possi-
ble, and a closed suction system should be used. Use of 
non-invasive positive-pressure ventilation with a face mask is 
prohibited because it can increase the risk of transmission. 
HCWs involved in the treatment and testing of patients under 
mechanical ventilation or placed on ECMO should rigorously 
adhere to hand hygiene and PPE wearing guidelines. When 
ECMO is performed, PAPR is recommended instead of a high-
ly efficient mask before donning a disposable surgical gown. 
To prevent bacterial and fungal infections in relation to the 
use of a vascular catheter, the catheter is inserted using asep-
tic technique and surveillance for catheter-related infection is 
required.
5) Visitor management
All hospital visitors should record every entrance and exit in 
the visitor log. Visiting patients with suspected and confirmed 
MERS-CoV infections should be limited. In inevitable cases, 
visitors should wear PPE. They should be trained in advance 
in appropriate procedures for hand hygiene and donning and 
removal of PPE. Visitation of individuals with signs/symptoms 
of acute respiratory infection is prohibited.
6. Hemodialysis patient management
Key recommendations
1. Dialysis of a patient with suspected or confirmed 
MERS-CoV infection should be performed in a sin-
gle-occupancy negative pressure isolation room using a 
portable dialysis machine (AIII).
2. Standard, contact, and droplet precautions should be 
adhered to during dialysis of a patient with suspected 
or confirmed MERS-CoV infection. Airborne precau-
tions are additionally required in potential aerosol-gen-
erating settings (AIII).
1) Rapid response measures in the event of suspected/
confirmed MERS-CoV infection detected in the dialysis 
room
The patient should be isolated immediately, and the risk lev-
el should be assessed (Table 10). In a tertiary hospital with an 
infection control division, a surgical mask should be put on 
the patient in the dialysis room, followed by transportation to 
an isolated room. At the same time, the infection control divi-
sion should be informed. In a small and medium-sized hospi-
tal without an infection control division, a surgical mask 
should be placed on the patient in the dialysis room, followed 
by transport to an isolated space. At the same time, the local 
community health center should be informed.
2) Hemodialysis guideline for a patient with suspected/
confirmed MERS-CoV infection
A patient with suspected/confirmed MERS-CoV infection 
should be given dialysis in a single-occupancy negative pres-
sure isolation room using a portable dialysis machine (AIII). 
The quarantined dialysis should be kept until the symptoms 
improve and two consecutive PCR tests prove negative. Dialy-
sis on a patient with suspected/confirmed MERS-CoV infec-
tion should be performed in keeping with standard, contact, 
and droplet precautions. Airborne precautions are additional-
ly required in situations likely to generate aerosols (AIII).
3) Dialysis guideline for asymptomatic contacts
Close contacts (high-risk group) without a fever or respira-
tory symptoms should be subjected to single-room hospital or 
self-imposed quarantine for 14 days from the last exposure. In 
Table 10. Risk assessment of a suspected/confirmed MERS-CoV infection case detected in the dialysis room
High-risk group  
(close contact)
1.  Receivers of dialysis at the same time and in the same place with a patient with suspected or confirmed MERS-
CoV infection
2.  Those who came into direct or indirect contact with a patient with suspected or confirmed MERS-CoV infection 
at a distance of under 2 m
3.  Receivers of dialysis on the same bed without proper disinfection measures after the dialysis of a patient with 
suspected or confirmed MERS-CoV infection
Low-risk group  
(casual contact)
1.  Receivers of dialysis on the same day in the same room as a patient with suspected or confirmed MERS-CoV 
infection, but at different times and on different beds
2.  Receivers of dialysis in the same room, but on different days
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the case of self-quarantine, the use of public transportation is 
prohibited. Instead, transport provided by the community 
health center should be used and a designated route should 
be followed to reach the dialysis room. Dialysis should be per-
formed in a single-occupancy isolation room using a portable 
dialysis machine. If no single isolation room is available for di-
alysis, the dialysis can be performed in the dialysis room after 
the dialysis of the low-risk group; thorough disinfection 
should be performed immediately after dialysis.
Casual contacts (low-risk group) without fever or respiratory 
symptoms should be closely monitored for 14 days after expo-
sure for the development of any suspicious symptoms. Fever 
and respiratory symptoms should be checked every day in a 
designated space at the hospital entrance to determine wheth-
er access to the dialysis room should be granted. The develop-
ment of fever and respiratory symptom should be monitored 
daily during dialysis, whereby the threshold value of fever is 
set lower than the normal value for dialysis patients (37.5˚C). 
Patients should be separated from each other by at least 2 m 
during dialysis. A surgical mask should be placed on every pa-
tient to completely cover their nose and mouth during dialy-
sis, and patients should be instructed to keep proper cough 
etiquette. Instruments or equipment should be properly dis-
infected when used by different patients. After each patient’s 
use, a dialysis machine should be meticulously disinfected. If 
a patient develops a fever or respiratory symptoms, he/she 
should be immediately quarantined and tested for MERS-CoV 
infection.
7. Surgery on a patient with suspected/confirmed 
MERS-CoV infection
Key recommendations
1. Elective surgery is recommended to be postponed to 
the latest permissible date, and only emergency surgery 
can be done (BIII).
2. Asymptomatic MERS-exposed patients are recom-
mended to undergo surgery according to common pro-
cedures for general patients (BII).
3. Surgery should be performed in a negative pressure iso-
lation room (AIII).
4. The patient is recommended to be on a mechanical 
ventilator with a HEPA filter during anesthesia, and dis-
posable products are recommended for expendable 
items (BIII).
5. The postoperative removal of the endotracheal tube 
and recovery is recommended to be performed in an 
isolation room (BII).
6. All HCWs involved in AGPs such as endotracheal intu-
bation should wear PPE (gown, highly efficient mask, 
gloves, hood, and goggles/face shield) (AII).
7. HCWs without PPE can enter the operation room only 
after the aerosols in the air have sufficiently been vent-
ed out (≥99%) (BII).
1) Basic rules
Elective surgery is recommended to be postponed to the lat-
est permissible date, and only emergency surgery is conduct-
ed (BIII). Surgery on a suspected patient should be performed 
after receiving the confirmatory diagnosis. However, emer-
gency surgery pending the diagnostic outcome can be per-
formed under the assumption of a confirmed case, and the 
number of HCWs contacting the patient and other persons in 
the operation room should be limited [27]. Asymptomatic 
MERS-exposed patients are recommended to undergo sur-
gery according to common procedures for general patients 
(BII) [5].
2) Surgical suite conditions
Surgery should be performed in an airborne infection isola-
tion room (negative pressure isolation room applying air-
borne precautions), as in the case of tuberculosis (AIII) [29]. A 
laminar airflow from the ceiling should be directed towards 
the operation field whereby the surrounding air is ventilated 
into the air duct of the air duct in all the walls so that the air 
does not rise above the surgical field. During surgery, the 
doors should be kept closed at all times except for when abso-
lutely necessary. The patient is recommended to be placed on 
a mechanical ventilator with a HEPA filter during anesthesia, 
and disposable products are recommended for disposable 
devices (BIII) [36].
3) Surgical procedure
The patient should be transported to the operation room in 
compliance with the aforementioned patient transportation 
rules, where the intubation and central venous cannulation 
required for surgery are performed. To ensure maximum pro-
tection of the HCWs involved during tube insertion and re-
moval, portable HEPA filters should be installed under expert 
guidance so that all interior air passes through the HEPA fil-
ters. The door should be kept closed for ≥30 min (ventilation 
at 12 ACH) until the air contaminated during intubation has 
been removed sufficiently (≥99%) [36]. Portable HEPA filters 
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should not be turned on intraoperatively.
For general anesthesia, the patient should be placed on a 
mechanical ventilator with a disposable antimicrobial HEPA 
filter mounted between the patient’s airway and the endotra-
cheal tube. For expendable items, the use of disposable prod-
ucts is recommended, whereas the contamination of the an-
esthetic machine and interior air can be prevented by a closed 
suction system [36].
The postoperative removal of the endotracheal tube and re-
covery is recommended to be performed in an isolation room 
(BII) [29]. However, in cases where the recovery room does 
not have a separate isolation chamber, instead of staying in 
the recovery room, the patient should be moved to a negative 
pressure isolation room following the aforementioned trans-
portation rules.
4) HCW management
The HCWs involved in AGPs including endotracheal incuba-
tion should wear PPE (AII) [17]. Instead of a highly efficient 
mask, PAPR can be used if technically possible (CIII) [37]. 
When not directly exposed to the surgical environment or dis-
infecting the surgical site, PPE specified for the operating 
room may be worn [17, 19]. After disinfecting the surgical site, 
gloves and gown should be changed prior to surgery.
5) Operating room environment management, cleaning, 
and disinfection
After the use of the operation room for AGPs, HCWs without 
PPE should enter the room only after aerosols in the operation 
room air have sufficiently been vented out [28]. The walls and 
floor need to be cleaned and disinfected in accordance with 
the aforementioned guidelines (BII) [38]. In particular, when 
endotracheal intubation should be performed in the operat-
ing room, the cough-induced air contamination level is as 
high as with AGPs, and corresponding disinfection measures 
should be taken to minimize the transmission of airborne in-
fectious agents (AII) [36].
Surgical instruments including respiratory devices should 
be disinfected in the proper manner complying with the relat-
ed guidelines. After surgery, the operating room should be 
ventilated under negative pressure for at least 30 min, and en-
vironmental disinfection and cleaning should be performed 
according to the related guidelines [28].
8. Personnel management
Key recommendations
1. All employees should abide by infection prevention/
control rules and receive training regarding MERS-CoV 
infection (AIII).
2. All employees excluding those with an underlying high-
risk disease and pregnant women are assigned to relat-
ed task areas on the preferential basis (BII).
3. Employees exposed to confirmed patients should be 
closely monitored for fever and respiratory symptoms 
for 14 days after the last exposure (AII).
4. Employees in service are recommended to be checked 
regularly for fever and respiratory symptoms, at least 
twice a day (BII).
5. HCWs should be monitored for fever and any respirato-
ry symptoms and a self-report system is set up for effi-
cient monitoring (AII).
All employees should follow infection prevention/control 
rules and receive training regarding MERS-CoV infection 
(AIII). Task forces should be used rather than outsourcing, 
and sufficient personnel should be provided considering their 
skill level and fatigue cycle.
Healthy staff members, excluding those having underlying 
high-risk illnesses such as diabetes, chronic lung, heart (ex-
cept for hypertension), renal, and liver diseases, as well as 
those taking immunosuppressive drugs and pregnant women 
are recommended to be assigned to related task areas (BII) 
[39, 40].
The list of HCWs that come into close contact with suspect-
ed and confirmed patients and the records of their exposure 
dates and durations should be maintained and shared (AII) 
[41]. Employees exposed to confirmed patients should be 
closely monitored for fever and respiratory symptom onset for 
14 days after the last exposure (AII) [3]. Moreover, employees 
in service are recommended to be checked for fever and re-
spiratory symptoms onset at least twice a day (BII) [42, 43]. 
Those with a cough or fever should stop working and seek ad-
vice from the MERS infection emergency committee regard-
ing their diagnosis, treatment, and quarantine need, avoiding 
contact with other employees [43]. HCWs with fever and re-
spiratory symptoms should be monitored in an efficient 
self-reporting system (AII) [28].
In the emergency department and at the screening desk, 
sufficient numbers of staffs are recommended to be assigned 
to classify patients according to their risk assessment and 
manage visitor log (BII) [16, 44].
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9. Management of the deceased
Key recommendations
1. The body of a deceased MERS patient is highly infec-
tious, and the corpse should be hermetically sealed, 
disinfected, and transported to minimize the transmis-
sion risk (AIII).
2. Those treating a corpse should wear appropriate PPE 
(AIII).
3. Corpses should be cremated (AIII).
1) Postmortem treatment
The body of a deceased MERS-infected person is highly in-
fectious, and to minimize the transmission risk, the corpse 
should be hermetically sealed, disinfected, and transported 
(AIII). If the deceased was a confirmed case of MERS-CoV in-
fection, an employee wearing PPE should enter the room at a 
time agreed upon with the bereaved to seal, disinfect, lay the 
corpse in a coffin, and go to a crematory using a funeral vehi-
cle. If a suspected MERS patient died while waiting for the 
confirmatory diagnosis, the corpse should be treated as that 
of a confirmed patient. A diagnostic specimen should be tak-
en for postmortem confirmatory testing, under expert guid-
ance in difficult cases. 
A postmortem caretaker wearing PPE should seal the corpse 
in keeping with corpse treatment guidelines (AIII). The corpse 
should not be washed, wiped, or undressed. Not only should 
the invasively used tubes (intravascular catheter or endotra-
cheal tube) be removed, but they should also be placed into 
an airtight bag with the corpse. The surface of the body bag 
should be disinfected, and the primary bag should be placed 
into a second bag for double sealing. The surface of the her-
metically doubled-sealed body bag should be disinfected and 
air-dried. The body bag is then moved then to a bed prepared 
for transportation.
2) Funeral transportation
Mortuary employees and the funeral parlor in charge of the 
deceased body should be informed of the transmission risk of 
infectious agents MERS-CoV. The body bag should be cleaned 
of any contaminants left on its surface, disinfected, air-dried, 
and transported to the crematory. The transporter of the body 
bag should wear PPE (AIII). If PPE was worn during the work, 
the transporter does not have to be isolated after the work. 
The crematory personnel in charge should wear PPE at all 
times [RPE (highly efficient mask or PAPR), coverall or apron 
covering sleeves, goggles or face shield, boot covers or rubber 
boots, double-gloving (the outer pair should be rubber 
gloves)]. Shrouding and embalming are prohibited. Instead, 
the body should be laid immediately in the coffin, followed by 
sealing and cremation. Transportation of the corpse should 
be minimized, and autopsy is avoided unless absolutely nec-
essary. The places and objects that came into contact with the 
body [patient room, mortuary (coffining), morgue (keeping), 
funeral vehicle (transportation), and funeral equipment] 
should all be disinfected after use.
10. Autopsy management
Key recommendations
1. If autopsy is required, it is decided in consultation with 
the authorities concerned (BIII).
2. Autopsy should be conducted in a well-ventilated loca-
tion (AII).
3. Care should be taken to minimize aerosol generation in 
the autopsy room (AIII).
In strongly suspected and confirmed cases of MERS-CoV in-
fection, autopsy should be avoided. If necessary, it should be 
decided in consultation with the authorities concerned, e.g. 
the Center for Disease Prevention and Control and the Minis-
try of Health and Welfare.
1) Equipment of the autopsy room
Autopsy should be conducted in a well-ventilated location 
(AII). Specifically, the autopsy room should meet the require-
ments for biosafety level 3, i.e. negative pressure facility at the 
ventilation rate [45].
2) Environmental management of the autopsy room
Care should be taken to minimize aerosol generation in the 
autopsy room (Table 11). Additionally, the ventilation system 
should run to reduce the amount of aerosols, and the air flow-
ing around the autopsy table should be directed away from 
the medical examiner (air from the ceiling towards the autop-
sy table and the surrounding air towards the walls under neg-
Table 11. Methods to reduce aerosol generation during an autopsy
1. Use a biological cabinet when handling small specimens.
2.  Avoid using a power saw; if absolutely necessary, use it with 
an attached vacuum device.
3.  High-pressure water sprays are to be avoided.
4.  Intestines are opened under water.
5.  Care should be taken to avoid splashes when handling 
organs (especially the lungs and gastrointestinal tract).
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ative pressure). The body should be transported in dou-
ble-sealed airtight body bags and stored in the morgue 
refrigerator until a safe autopsy environment is established. 
The medical examiner should wear PPE at all times [highly ef-
ficient mask or PAPR, airtight coverall, rubber apron, goggles 
or face shield, rubber boots to the knee height, autopsy gloves 
(cut-proof synthetic mesh gloves) or double gloves] and 
should move along a designated route (Fig. 4). After autopsy, 
the open sites should be sutured and the corpse should be 
cleaned with a 5% sodium hypochlorite solution diluted with 
detergent at the rate of 1:10 and put into an airtight body bag. 
11. Equipment disinfection
Key recommendations
1. Single-use instruments and supplies should be used as 
far as possible (AII).
2. Cleaning personnel should wear PPE (highly efficient 
mask, long-sleeved waterproof gown, goggles or face 
Table 12. Application scope and disinfection method depending on sterilization and disinfection levels
Category Scope Method Required time
Sterilization Critical instruments High-temperature 
sterilization
Steam
Dry heat
Low-temperature 
sterilization
Ethylene oxide gas
Hydrogen peroxide gas plasma
Chemical sterilization
(immersion)
≥2% Glutaraldehyde 20-25˚C, 10 h
7.5% Hydrogen peroxide 6 h
0.2% peracetic acid 50 min
7.35% Hydrogen peroxide + 0.23% peracetic acid 3 h
1.0% hydrogen peroxide + 0.08% peracetic acid) 8 h
High-level 
disinfection
Semi-critical 
instruments
Chemical sterilization
(immersion)
≥2% Glutaraldehyde 2%: 20˚C, 20 min
2.5%: 35˚C, 5 min
0.55% ortho-phthalaldehyde 20˚C, 12 min
25˚C, 5 min
7.5% hydrogen peroxide 30 min
7.35% hydrogen peroxide + 0.23% peracetic acid 15 min
1.0% hydrogen peroxide + 0.08% peracetic acid 25 min
650-675 ppm hypochlorite (prepared in situ 
through electrolysis)
10 min
Intermediate-
level 
disinfection
Partially semi-critical 
instruments, non-
critical instruments
(contact duration ≥1 
min)
Active chlorine ≥1,000 ppm
Sodium hypochlorite
Phenolic disinfectant
Iodophor disinfectant
70-90% alcohol formulation (dthanol/isopropanol)
Low-level 
disinfection
Non-critical 
instruments
Chemical sterilization
(immersion; contact 
duration ≥1 min)
Active chlorine ≥100 ppm
Sodium hypochlorite
Phenolic disinfectants
Iodophor disinfectants
Quaternary ammonium salt formulation
70-90% alcohol formulation (ethanol/isopropanol)
Figure 4. Movement of the autopsy team: taking off shoes and clothes 
and wearing a surgical gown and other PPE in the dress-in room (1), 
entering the autopsy room (2), taking off PPE and performing hand 
hygiene in the dress-out room (3), re-entering the dress-in room to put on 
the shoes and clothes (4) (adapted from WHO guideline [11]).
PPE, personal protective equipment.
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shield, hood, boot covers or rubber boots, double gloves 
with a robust outer pair) (AIII).
3. The recommendations of the disinfectant manufactur-
ers regarding attenuation method, contact duration, ex-
piration date and effective concentration should be 
thoroughly adhered to (AIII).
During patient care or treatment of cases with suspected 
and confirmed MERS-CoV infection, single-use instruments 
and items should be used whenever possible (AII) [11]. If re-
use is necessary, reusable instruments and supplies should be 
subjected to prescribed safe reprocessing procedures, such as 
cleaning and disinfection or sterilization. 
1) Cleaning
Medical instruments contaminated by blood, body fluids, 
secretions, or excreta should be kept from drying until they 
can be cleaned, and from contaminating the environment 
with those. Cleaning personnel should wear high-protection 
PPE (highly efficient mask, long-sleeved waterproof gown, 
goggles or face shield, hood, boot covers or rubber boots, dou-
ble gloves with a robust outer pair) (AIII).
2) Disinfection/sterilization
Medical instruments and supplies are divided into critical, 
semi-critical, and non-critical categories depending on the in-
fection risk, and they require sterilization, high-level disinfec-
tion or sterilization, and low-level disinfection, respectively. 
Table 12 describes the category-dependent disinfection and 
sterilization methods, and Table 13 presents the disinfection 
methods for the instruments for respiratory therapies with a 
high degree of contamination. To make a non-critical instru-
ment fit for reuse, only a low-level disinfection is necessary. 
All instrument surfaces should be in contact with disinfectant 
for at least 1 min using sodium hypochlorite containing ≥500 
ppm active chlorine, quaternary ammonium salt formulation, 
or 70-90% ethyl alcohol. Ethyl alcohol is used exclusively for 
the rapid disinfection of narrow-surfaced medical instruments 
because it is highly volatile and thus difficult to keep on in-
strument surfaces for longer than 1 min. 
Care should be taken to use only disinfectants certified by 
manufacturers accredited by the Korean FDA, U.S. FDA, Euro-
pean CE, and the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor and Wel-
fare pursuant to Article 4 (sterilization and disinfection meth-
ods) of the Disinfection Guidelines for Medical Instruments 
and Supplies issued by the Ministry of Health and Welfare, 
thereby carefully adhering to the recommendations of the 
manufacturers regarding attenuation method, contact dura-
tion, expiration date and effective concentration (AIII).
12. Cleaning and environmental disinfection 
measures
Key recommendations
1. Cleaning or environmental disinfection personnel 
should receive infection prevention training (AIII).
2. PPE should be worn during cleaning or environmental 
disinfection (AIII). 
3. Instead of spraying disinfectant, a clean dry towel 
should be sufficiently soaked in it, and all environmen-
tal surfaces should be thoroughly wiped for over 1 min 
(AII).
4. Sodium hypochlorite, alcohol, phenolic compounds, 
quaternary ammonium compounds, and peroxygen 
compounds are suitable as environmental disinfectants 
(AIII). 
5. Upon completion of environmental disinfection, venti-
lation at 6 ACH during least 2 hours should be provided, 
and the surfaces should be dried with disposable towels 
and dust cloths (AIII).
1) General principles
Employees responsible for cleaning and environmental dis-
infection should be trained in related infection prevention 
measures, such as the proper procedures and methods of 
cleaning and environmental disinfection, the importance of 
their tasks, types of environmental disinfectants and their di-
lution and utilization methods, management of and adher-
ence to expiration date, storage of cleaning devices, and don-
ning/removal of PPE (AIII). Whenever performing cleaning or 
environmental disinfection, they should wear the aforemen-
tioned high-protection PPE (AIII).
Instead of spraying disinfectant (prohibited), environmental 
surfaces should be soaked with environmental disinfection 
for over 1 min, followed by meticulous wiping (AII) [46]. 
When possible, disposable cleaning and environmental disin-
fection tools and supplies should be used and discarded im-
mediately after use. A contaminated environmental surface 
should be disinfected immediately, a patient room should be 
disinfected at least once a day, and environmental surfaces 
exposed to frequent contact should be disinfected frequently. 
 
2) Disinfectants
For environmental disinfection, low-level disinfectants are 
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effective enough [11], such as sodium hypochlorite, alcohol, 
phenolic compounds, quaternary ammonium compounds, 
and peroxygen compounds [31, 47], and antiviral disinfectants 
approved by the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety may be 
used (http://ezdrug.mfds.go.kr) (AIII). When using environ-
mental disinfectants, the dilution ratio, contact duration, and 
warnings specified by the manufacturers should be carefully 
followed. Sodium hypochlorite is used by diluting 5% Clorox 
available on the market by 100 times to reach the concentra-
tion of active chlorine (0.05% or 500 ppm). 
3) Final disinfection of a patient room after discharge
Specialized cleaning personnel should be assigned. Training 
should be provided in advance, and the cleaning and disinfec-
tion procedures should be monitored. 
Impermeable surfaces such as ceiling and lights should be 
meticulously wiped with disposable towels or cloths soaked 
with 0.05% (500 ppm) sodium hypochlorite or a comparable 
medical environmental disinfectant. Permeable surfaces such 
as textured materials should be discarded and replaced or im-
mersed in 0.05% (500 ppm) sodium hypochlorite solution for 
30 min. For environmental surface disinfection, H2O2 vapor or 
H2O2 dry mist can be used on impermeable and permeable 
surfaces. To ensure safety, well-trained personnel should be 
available, and the guidelines specified by manufacturers 
should be adhered to rigorously.
Upon completion of disinfection, the room should be suffi-
ciently ventilated; after at least 2 hours of ventilation at 6 ACH, 
all surfaces should be wiped with disposable towels soaked 
with water (AII) [28]. After a final check, the room is ready to 
receive a new patient. 
13. Laundry and staff uniform management 
Key recommendations
1. Personnel in charge of laundry should be trained in in-
fection prevention and control measures and regular 
monitoring of laundering procedures should be con-
ducted (AIII). 
2. Employees treating laundry should wear appropriate 
PPE (AII).
3. Contaminated linen should be put into a laundry bag 
directly in the isolation room or area with minimal ma-
nipulation, to avoid contamination of air, surfaces and 
people (AII). 
4. Staff uniforms are classified as healthcare facility laun-
dry (BII).
Personnel in charge of laundry should be trained in infec-
tion prevention and control, and regular monitoring should 
be conducted to check whether laundering is performed in 
compliance with safety regulations (AIII). Employees han-
dling contaminated laundry items should wear PPE and per-
form hand hygiene after removal of PPE (AII) [11]. Laundry 
used by healthcare facility employees and patients are reus-
able under the related law. Special attention should be paid to 
preventing microbial contamination in the process of using, 
storing, transporting, and reprocessing procedures. Once 
used, all laundry items in an isolation room should be put into 
a collection container with minimal manipulation, to avoid 
contamination of air, surfaces and people (AII) [11]. All laun-
dry items from patients with MERS-CoV infection are regard-
ed contaminated, so they should be processed without expo-
sure to the environment or people. Washing and drying linen 
and laundry should be performed according to routine stan-
dards and procedures of the health-care facility. High-tem-
perature laundering should be performed at 70°C for at least 
25 min using detergent or disinfectant. Low-temperature 
laundering (<70°C) should be performed using chemical 
agents at proper concentrations. If the process of proper col-
lection, transportation, classification, and storage is not possi-
ble, laundry items should be discarded in compliance with 
medical waste treatment procedures.
HCWs engaged in MERS patient care are at a high risk of ex-
posure to microorganisms, and they need to wear PPE fre-
quently. This should be considered when selecting staff uni-
forms. Staff uniforms are classified as healthcare facility 
laundry (BII) [11]. 
14. Tableware management
Key recommendations
1. Tableware used by a quarantined patient is recom-
mended to be put into a container or bag in the patient 
room and disposed of, avoiding contamination of the 
environment and people (BIII). 
2. Disposable tableware can be used when possible and 
discarded immediately after use, per medical waste 
management guidelines (BIII).
3. Reusable tableware is recommended to be washed in a 
dishwasher. If a dishwasher is not available, it is recom-
mended to be washed by hand with detergents while 
wearing the appropriate PPE (BIII).
Tableware used by a patient with suspected or confirmed 
MERS-CoV infection should be managed following the same 
  http://dx.doi.org/10.3947/ic.2015.47.4.278  •  Infect Chemother 2015;47(4):278-302www.icjournal.org 299
procedures as those of general tableware under the related 
law. Tableware is recommended to be put into a container or 
bag in the patient room and disposed of, avoiding contamina-
tion of the environment and people (BIII). However, the use of 
disposable tableware is recommended to minimize exposure 
to MERS-CoV (BIII). Reusable tableware is recommended to 
be washed in a dishwasher using hot water and detergent, or 
manually while wearing PPE and using detergent if a dish-
washer is not available (BIII). Since the tableware used by a 
patient may be contaminated with MERS-CoV, care is re-
quired to be taken not to expose it during collection (BIII).
15. Medical waste management
Key recommendations
1. Medical waste contaminated with blood or body fluids 
of a patient with suspected or confirmed MERS-CoV in-
fection should be hermetically sealed using a designat-
ed container; after disinfecting the outer surface, it is 
transported and stored (AIII). 
2. The medical facility should provide training in infection 
prevention for the personnel in charge of waste dispos-
al, and employees handling waste should wear appro-
priate PPE (AII).
Great care should be given to preventing the transmission of 
MERS-CoV from the waste contaminated by the blood or 
body fluids of a patient with suspected or confirmed MERS-
CoV infection to the environment or people. Disposal of such 
waste should be performed by classifying it as quarantined 
medical waste according to the relevant regulations. It should 
be hermetically sealed in a designated container, and after 
disinfecting the container surface to minimized the exposure 
of environment to MERS-CoV, it should be transported for 
storage (AIII). The medical facility should provide training in 
infection prevention for the personnel in charge of waste dis-
posal, and employees handling waste should wear appropri-
ate PPE (AII) [11]. Blood or excreta of a patent should be dis-
posed via the seweragesystem while taking great care to avoid 
possible generation of splash or spray during handling of 
waste.
Limitations
Although this guideline sought to create recommendations 
on MERS infection control by searching for as many articles 
as possible through systematic literature review, the research 
findings that could be used as evidence were very limited. It is 
necessary to revise the guideline based on future research 
findings on South Korea’s 2015 Middle East Respiratory Syn-
drome (MERS) outbreak. Moreover, the application of the 
present guideline can differ, depending on the individual cir-
cumstances, and specialists’ opinions should be reflected with 
consideration of the specific individual circumstances.
Plans for revision
As per plan, this infection control guideline will be periodi-
cally revised, once every 2 years to reflect the newest research 
findings that can serve as appropriate evidences; the timing of 
revision can be adjusted in cases where crucial research find-
ings are reported.
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